business conditions. Furthermore, we find evidence of an information effect, that is, the multidimensional repurchase decision (regarding both the repurchase program and offer terms) and the announcement period price reaction are jointly determined. Finally, we show that the tender offer sample firms would have experienced much smaller abnormal announcement period returns had they made open market repurchases, and that the open market repurchasing sample firms would have made excessive offers (worth almost half of their market capitalization) had they chosen tender offers. Our conditional event study estimates indicate that firms exhibit comparative advantage in their choice of repurchase programs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the modeling framework of our conditional event study. We introduce the explanatory variables in Section II. The data are described in Section III. We report the estimation results in Section IV and conclude in Section V.
I. The Empirical Model
This section develops an empirical model of stock repurchases that is consistent with two propositions: 1) Managers make a rational, utility maximizing decision to repurchase; and 2) the decision to repurchase (e.g., the choice of repurchase programs and terms) is multi-faceted. The model allows us to explain the repurchase choice, to test for an information effect in the choice, and to make predictions.
Self-selection occurs when managers do not choose corporate events randomly but, rather, choose on the basis of firm characteristics and their firms' comparative advantage in each alternative. According to Acharya (1988) and EMW (1990) , this non-randomness in corporate event announcements causes a potential selection bias in standard event studies. To eliminate the self-selection bias in our study of stock repurchases, this paper adopts the conditional event study 4 See Poirier (1995) Chapter 6 for a discussion of the different statistical properties of Bayesian and Classical estimators. framework of Acharya (1988) , EMW (1990) and Prabhala (1997) .
In share repurchases, managers make several decisions: Which repurchase program to use, how many shares to buy back, and what price/premium to offer. Vermaelen (1981) , Comment and Jarrell (1991) , and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) all find that the price reaction to a repurchase announcement depends on both the type and terms of the repurchase offer. Empirically, there is potential endogeneity between the choice of the repurchase program, the choice of offer terms, and the announcement period price reaction. We develop a system of equations framework to account for simultaneity.
More specifically, in our switching regression model, managers choose between tender offers and open market repurchases based on an objective function. 5 Then, under each repurchase regime, our model examines the determination of repurchase terms and price reaction. One important feature of our switching regression model formulation is that the regimes describing firm behavior are independent of managers' actual repurchase choices. Consider a firm that makes a tender offer repurchase: Its offer terms and the price reaction are explained by the behavioral regressions under the tender offer regime. However, the behavioral regressions under the open market repurchase regime would have described the offer terms and price reaction of the same firm had its managers chosen an open market repurchase. Thus, after the two sets of behavioral equations (under each of the two regimes, respectively) are correctly estimated, we can compute the expected offer terms and announcement period price reaction had managers chosen the alternative repurchase program. The remainder of this section explains how our model is developed. We assume that 5 The earliest example of the switching regression model is Roy (1951) . Other examples are found in the labor economics literature where individuals rationally select into different regimes (union/nonunion, public/private sectors and occupation choices) based on their comparative advantage in each of them (see Maddala (1983) Chapter 9 for a survey). Dunbar (1995) applies the switching regression model to examine the role of warrants in underwriter 
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After choosing the repurchase program, managers also have to decide the terms of the offer, and the stock price changes around the repurchase announcement. Thus, for each repurchase regime, we have a set of equations describing managers' choice of repurchase terms and the price reaction. In the open market repurchase regime, managers decide only on the proportion of shares sought, while in the tender offer regime they must also choose the tender premium. In summary, our switching regression model can be characterized by the following six-equation system:
,
compensation on offering cost. 
and set 1 ) ( = ε Var because * I is observed only as a binary variable.
Equations (2)-(6) describing the two repurchase regimes are in reduced form. We do not estimate a structural form system due to the presence of multiple regimes and simultaneity. One goal of our study is to predict the announcement period return for the unchosen repurchase regime (e.g., had the tender offer firms chosen open market repurchases). If the announcement return is conditional on the repurchase terms, then it is impossible to predict the return without knowing the repurchase terms, but those terms are unknown for the unchosen repurchase regime. The only way to make announcement period return predictions is to estimate the repurchase terms and returns in separate equations, which necessitates a reduced form model. Nevertheless, our empirical model in
Equations (1)- (6) is consistent with a broad class of structural models in which managers maximize an objective function based on private information and the market draws inferences based on public announcements.
The superscripts ( * ) in Equations (1) with unobservables (the unchosen repurchase alternatives by our sample firms). When the augmented data are generated in a manner consistent with the structure of the model (i.e., they are the fitted values from the switching model in
Equations (1)- (6)), the distribution of the augmented data converges to the distribution of the observed data. We then use the likelihood of both the observed and the augmented data as a proxy for the likelihood of the observed data. Conditional on the observed and augmented data, approximate posteriors for the model parameters may be obtained by using standard simulation methods. We then integrate out, using the Gibbs sampler (Gelfand and Smith (1990) ), the uncertainty introduced by the involvement of unobserved data to get posteriors conditional on only the observed data (the actual repurchase choices made by our sample firms). 
where ) (x φ and ) (x Φ denote the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions,
known as the Mills ratio, represents the correction term induced by managerial self-selection to the open market repurchase sample. Note that the selectivity term in Equation (9) also involves the pair-wise covariance, 2 u ε σ , between the program choice equation (Equation (1)) and the target proportion equation (Equation (3)). A primary goal of our research is to examine whether there is an information effect in the repurchase choice. One implication of the information effect is that the determination of the repurchase terms should not be independent of the choice of the repurchase program. In the case of the open market repurchase regime, this can be evaluated by testing the statistical significance of the covariance term . Vermaelen (1981) concludes that both fixed-price tender offers and open market repurchases are information signals. Much of the subsequent research has reached similar conclusions (Dann (1981) , Vermaelen (1984) , Ofer and Thakor (1987) , Persons (1994 ), McNally (1999a ), and McNally (1999b ). Comment and Jarrell (1991) On the other hand, tender offers are the stronger signal of firm value according to Comment and Jarrell (1991) . When there is great news about earnings, large shareholders would want it to be conveyed to the market and one effective means of communication is a tender offer. However, tender offers are costly endeavors that drain a firm's financial slack. As a result, tender offers create conflict between large shareholders who want the positive information reflected in the stock price and managers who would prefer to retain the slack in the firm. We expect tender offers to take place when the conflict is resolved in favour of the shareholders, and so factors that predict the outcome of the conflict will predict the occurrence of a tender offer. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that the management-shareholder conflict can be resolved when there are large shareholders who monitor and discipline management. Large shareholders are willing to monitor, because their large stake yields a return in excess of the cost of monitoring. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that the cost of monitoring by large shareholders is lower in small firms, so small firms are more likely to have large, active shareholders. Demsetz and Lehn also argue that firms with greater firm-specific uncertainty provide more opportunities for gains from monitoring and so are more likely to attract large, active shareholders. In summary, the corporate control literature predicts that tender offers are made by small, risky firms with large shareholders and financial slack.
II. Explaining Repurchases
MGMT is the fraction of outstanding shares held by officers and directors. We use MGMT as a proxy for large shareholders, as large shareholders influence corporate decisions mainly by being members of the board.
SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of common equity. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that small firms are more likely to have large, active shareholders. When there are conflicts between managers and shareholders over the decision to initiate a tender offer, we expect tender offers to be made by small firms with large shareholders. Size may also be related to the choice of repurchase programs because it is widely used as a proxy for the degree of information asymmetry. Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Vermaelen (1981) argue that large firms are more thoroughly analyzed, and so are less likely to be undervalued than small firms. Following this information asymmetry argument, small firms are more likely to use the more effective signaltender offers.
We measure financial slack in three ways: Free cash flow, future cash needs, and external financing costs. Free cash flow (CASH) is constructed following Lehn and Poulsen's (1989) definition. 6 We use the market-to-book equity ratio (M/B) to represent growth opportunities and future cash needs. According to Bagwell and Shoven (1988) , Opler and Titman (1993), Dittmar (1998) , and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) , firms with low market-to-book ratios have poor investment opportunities. Such firms do not need funds for new projects, and thus should have financial slack. Finally, leverage is often used as a measure of marginal external financing costs (see Fenn and Liang (1997) and references therein). Ceteris paribus, firms with higher debt levels are more likely to go bankrupt and so should find external financing more expensive. We expect that highly leveraged firms are less likely to engage in tender offers in order to preserve their financial slack and to avoid external financing. In this paper, leverage is the sum of long-and shortterm debt over total assets (DEBT).
VOLR is the annualized standard deviation of daily returns calculated prior to the announcement. 7 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that firms with greater firm-specific uncertainty (as measured by the standard deviation of stock returns) are more likely to attract large, active shareholders. We expect that firms with volatile returns are more likely to have large shareholders and to make tender offers. On the other hand, the option hypothesis of Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) on open market repurchases suggests that firms with volatile returns possess valuable exchange options, and so are more likely to create those options by announcing open market repurchases.
XRET is the cumulative excess return over the 40-day period preceding the announcement.
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Both Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report a steady decline in share price prior to the announcement for the open market repurchasing firms, but Comment and Jarrell (1991) do not find the same phenomenon for the tender offer firms. Following Bagwell and Shoven (1988) , Comment and Jarrell (1991) , Dittmar (1998) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998), we include XRET as an explanatory variable.
D/P is the dividend yield, and it is included as a proxy for the firm's tax clientele. 9 Firms with low dividend yields are hypothesized to appeal to investors with high marginal tax rates (Bagwell and Shoven (1988) , Dittmar (1998), Fenn and Liang (1997) ). Investors at high tax rates prefer stock repurchases as a means of distribution, and so firms with low dividend yields are more 7 Volatility is calculated over the 160 trading days prior to the announcement (i.e., over days −166 to −7). 8 The daily excess return is obtained by using the market model estimated over the interval from 157 days to 50 days before the announcement. The excess returns are cumulated over days −49 to −10. 9 The dividend yield is the ratio of common dividends per share over share price. The share price is the average price over the 60-trading day period ending 7 days before announcement.
likely to make tender offers. On the other hand, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 limited the tax benefit of repurchases relative to dividends. 10 Our sample spans this regulatory change, so we expect a weakening tax clientele effect.
VOLM is the annualized standard deviation of daily returns on the CRSP value-weighted market index prior to the announcement. When the market is unsettled, the commitment inherent in tender offers make them risky endeavorsthere is a greater chance that the offer will not be successful at the quoted terms. We expect that firms are more likely to adopt open market share repurchases in times of market turbulence.
TERMPRM is the difference between the yield on 10-year U.S. government bonds and the yield on 3-month Treasury bills. This difference indicates the phase of the short-term business cycle at the time of the announcement. The term premium (TERMPRM) is low around business cycle peaks and high near troughs (Fama and French (1989) ). Given that our sample covers a long period of time (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) , we are interested in examining the effects of the business cycle on firms'
repurchasing behavior.
DEFPRM is the difference in yields between Moody's Baa bonds and Aaa bonds.
According to Fama and French (1989) , the movements in the default premium (DEFPRM) are related to longer-term business episodes that span several measured business cycles. In practice, share repurchases, and tender offers in particular, are often used as a takeover defense (Bagwell (1991) ). Lack of data on takeovers prevents us from examining the effects of takeover bids on repurchases directly. Instead, we use DEFPRM as a proxy for the merger/acquisition waves over our sample period. It is conjectured that low DEFPRMs correspond to active corporate control periods when firms are more likely to undertake tender offers in order to fend off hostile bids.
III. The Data

A. Sample Description
Our sample of repurchasing firms comes from a combination of that used by Vermaelen (1981), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) and Comment and Jarrell (1991) . repurchasing firms, and have lower market-to-book equity ratios. In summary, we find that tender offers take place in small, risky firms with concentrated shareholdings, and financial slack.
B. Summary Statistics
11 The post crash period is between October 19, 1987 and December 31, 1987 . During the post-Crash period, there were many more firms (257) announced open market share repurchases than that (6) announced tender offers. Other studies (e.g., Comment and Jarrell (1991) , Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) , and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) ) omit these post-crash announcements because they have somewhat different characteristics than regular announcements, and we opt to do the same. We also removed repeat announcements of the same repurchase within the same month. 12 Because they are less frequent, our tender offer repurchase sample spans a longer time period (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) than our open market sample (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) . A tender offer sample drawn from a common time period (e.g., 1985-1988) yields very similar results to those reported below, but with less precision since the sample size is smaller. 13 For Dutch auctions, we compute the tender premium using the announced maximum offer price. Ex post, the final repurchase price is more highly correlated with the maximum offer price (correlation = .89) than with the minimum offer price (correlation = .74), and so the maximum price is more comparable to the tender price in fixed-price offers.
Open market repurchases are preceded by a significant decline in price. The cumulative average excess return is -1.8% over the 40-day period preceding the announcement, but there is no apparent price trend preceding tender offer repurchases. The 3-day (5-day, 7-day) buy-and-hold average excess return around the announcement is 9.8% (10.2%, 10.8%) for tender offers, and 2.3% (2.2%, 2.2%) for open market repurchases, respectively. These numbers are similar to those reported in Comment and Jarrell (1991) , Nohel and Tarhan (1998) , and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) . Finally, open market share repurchases are more likely to take place in times of turbulent markets or weak economic conditions.
IV. The Results
This section reports the results from estimating our endogenous switching regression model. 14 Subsection A discusses the results from the probit equation (Equation (1)) examining the choice of repurchase programs. We test for an information effect in Subsection B. The lack of a structural model for the two repurchase regimes (Equations (2)-(6)) prevents us from drawing causal inferences from the reduced form coefficients. Nonetheless, in Subsection C, those coefficient estimates are important inputs for obtaining the predicted offer terms and price reaction had managers chosen a different repurchase program.
A. Explaining the Repurchase Choice
The probit equation (Equation (1)) examines managers' choice of the repurchase program, and the Bayesian estimates of the regression coefficients are given in the first column of Table 3 .
Firms with higher cash flows (CASH) and lower market-to-book equity ratios (M/B) are more likely to make tender offers, which suggests that firms with financial slack are more likely to 14 We have tried to include change variables into the regressions, such as changes in DEBT, D/P, CASH, and the results are similar to those reported in Table 3 . We also estimated the model using a sample that excludes the 31 firms that made both tender offers and open market share repurchases during the sample period. The results are similar to those engage in tender offers. Both the fraction of shares held by insiders (MGMT) and the volatility of returns (VOLR) are positively and significantly related to the likelihood of a tender offer. The latter result is contrary to the prediction of Ikenberry and Vermaelen's (1996) option model, but the results above are consistent with the implications of the corporate control literature (Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , and Shleifer and Vishny (1986)).
As noted earlier, tender offers are costly, and our results from estimating Equation (1) show that tender offer firms have greater financial slack. The reduction in financial slack associated with a tender offer would be unpopular with managers and they are likely to object to it. Consistent with that view, we find that tender offers are more likely to take place in firms that have large shareholders who are willing to monitor and overcome the resistance of the managers.
Firms with higher dividend yields are more likely to make tender offers, which is contrary to the tax clientele hypothesis but consistent with existing studies on this subject (Bagwell and Shoven (1988) , Dittmar (1998) , and Fenn and Liang (1997) ). We suspect that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 helped eliminate the tax clientele effect.
The results in Table 3 also suggest that tender offers do not occur in turbulent markets and/or when the economy is weak. There is an inverse relationship between the likelihood of a tender offer and market volatility (VOLM), which suggests that firms prefer the open market repurchase when the market is turbulent. The likelihood of a tender offer is lower when the yield curve is steeper (the term premium TERMPRM is larger). A steep yield curve usually coincides with the contraction phase of the business cycle, so it appears that firms do not initiate tender offers when business conditions are weak. Table 4 reports estimates of the correlation matrix in Equation (7) for our six-equation reported in Table 3. switching regression model. We find strong evidence of an information effect in the repurchase decision-making process. The error term in the repurchase choice equation (Equation (1)) is significantly correlated with the error terms in the percentage of shares sought equation (Equation (2)) and the tender premium equation (Equation (4)) under the tender offer regime, and with the error term in the percentage of shares sought equation (Equation (3)) under the open market repurchase regime. This implies that managers' private information, , ε is incorporated in a systematic fashion into the choices of the repurchase program and offer terms. We do not find that the announcement period price reaction is directly related to the surprise component of the repurchase choice. There is no significant correlation between the errors in the repurchase choice equation (Equation (1)) and the announcement period return equation (Equation (5)) for the tender offers, or between the errors in the repurchase choice equation (Equation (1)) and the announcement period return equation (Equation (6)) for the open market repurchases.
B. Evidence of Information Effect
While we find no direct relationship between the choice of the repurchase program and the price reaction, we do find an indirect relationship between the program choice and the price reaction through the choice of repurchase terms. There is significant correlation between the error terms in the tender premium equation (Equation (4)) and the announcement period return equation (Equation (5)) under the tender offer regime. We find also that there is significant correlation between the error terms in the percentage of shares sought equation (Equation (3)) and the announcement period return equation (Equation (6)) under the open market repurchase regime.
Finally, we find significant correlation between the error terms in the proportion of shares sought equation (Equation (2)) and the tender premium equation (Equation (4)) under the tender offer regime.
These results suggest that managers' choice of the repurchase program does convey important information to the market, and that the choice of the program is not independent of the choice of repurchase terms. The significance of these relationships implies that the failure to account for managerial self-selection produces biased estimates.
C. Predicted Offer Terms and Price Reaction
Our main purpose for estimating the coefficients (β 1 , β 2 , α 1 , θ 1 , θ 2 ) of the regime Equations (2)- (6) is to make predictions that are free of the selection bias. Table 5 Table 3 to obtain the offer terms and announcement returns that they could expect under each repurchase regime. For instance, consider a firm with the median characteristics of our tender offer sample (as shown in Table 2 ). Our model estimates that the likelihood for such a firm to make a tender offer is 27%. Had the firm chosen the tender offer, it would have sought 30%
of the shares outstanding at a premium of 29% above the pre-announcement price and would have Table 5 gives the predicted mean values using OLS estimates that ignore managerial self-selection. The OLS estimates produce very different predictions for the sample firms compared with those obtained from the switching regression estimates, which provides evidence of selection bias in OLS estimates.
V. Conclusions
This paper employs a conditional event study framework to investigate the factors that affect a firm's choice of the repurchase program, and to examine the links between that choice, the determination of repurchase terms, and the announcement period price reaction. Our approach is different from standard event studies in two respects. First, managers make the repurchase decision to maximize an objective function. Second, the type and terms of the repurchase program and the price reaction around the announcement are jointly determined.
Our conditional event study shows that firms with higher cash flows, poorer investment opportunities, and larger insider shareholdings are more likely to make tender offers, as are firms with higher dividend yields and greater volatility of returns. In periods of market turbulence or weak business conditions, firms prefer the open market share repurchase. We also present evidence of an information effect in stock repurchases. That is, there is a direct relationship between the choice of the repurchase program and the offer terms, and between the offer terms and the announcement period price reactionthere is an indirect relationship between the price reaction and the choice of the repurchase program.
Finally, our switching regression estimates allow managers to evaluate the counterfactuals:
The offer terms and announcement return their firm would have expected had they chosen the alternative repurchase program. For instance, had our open market repurchasing sample firms executed tender offers, the proportion of shares sought would have been 35.5% of the shares outstanding (vs. 6.9% in the open market), the tender premium 33.4% above the pre-announcement price (vs. 0%), and the 5-day abnormal announcement period return would have been 16% (vs.
2.2%). Moreover, the tender offer sample firms would have made open market repurchases for 10.6% of their outstanding shares (vs. 19.7% in tender offers) and would have experienced a 5-day abnormal announcement period return of 3.7% (vs. 10.2%). We conclude that firms do not randomly choose across different repurchase programs but exhibit comparative advantage in their chosen repurchase schemes.
The empirical model developed in this paper is very general and can be adapted easily to other areas in finance whenever the event under investigation is an endogenous choice. Potential applications of our model are the debt versus equity financing decision, initial public offerings, seasoned equity offers, changes in dividend policy and takeovers.
Estimation Appendix
Due to the non-linearity in the likelihood function of our six-equation switching regression (caused by the binary choice variable I ), full information maximum likelihood estimation is generally avoided in favor of less efficient but computationally simpler estimation procedures such as the two-step algorithms developed by Heckman (1976 Heckman ( , 1979 . Likewise, due to the integration involved in the likelihood function, the posterior distribution for the system Equations (1)- (6) has no analytical expression. 15 In this paper, we apply the Bayesian approach developed in Koop and Poirier (1997) to conduct a finite sample likelihood-based analysis of our six-equation system.
First we record the data as follows, Complication arises when the first diagonal element of the variance-covariance matrix Σ in Equation (7) is fixed at 1 due to identification reasons. We reparameterize it as where τ is a five by one vector, Ω a five by five matrix. There is a one to one correspondence between the elements in Σ and that of Ω , τ .
, we assume the following prior distribution Premium is the announced tender premium over the closing market price 4 days before the offer. Size is the market value of common equity. Debt is the sum of the short-and long-term debt to total assets. Xret is the cumulative excess return for the 40-day period prior to the announcement. D/P is the dividend yield. Cash is free cash flow standardized by total assets. M/B is the market-to-book equity ratio. Xret3, Xret5, and Xret7 are the 3-, 5-and 7-day buy-and-hold average excess returns centered on the announcement day, respectively. Beta is the CAPM beta estimated from the market model. Volr, Volm are the annualized standard deviation of daily returns and market returns, respectively. Termprm is the difference between 10-year U. (1), the binary choice variable 1 = I if managers choose the tender offer repurchase, 0 otherwise. Mgmt is the proportion of shares held by officers and directors. Size is the logarithm of the market value of common equity. Debt is the sum of the short-and long-term debt to total assets. Xret is the cumulative excess return for the 40-day period prior to the announcement. D/P is the dividend yield. Cash is free cash flow standardized by total assets. M/B is the market-to-book equity ratio. Volr, Volm are the annualized standard deviations of daily returns and market returns, respectively. Termprm is the term premium. Defprm is the default premium. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Tender Offer Regime
Open Market Repurchase Regime Choice of Repurchase Table 4 Correlation
Matrix of Endogenous Switching Regression Model
This table presents posterior estimates of the off-diagonal correlation coefficients of the variance-covariance matrix Σ in Equation (7). The corresponding posterior standard deviations are given in the S.D. column. ε is the error term in the probit equation (Equation (1) e is the error term in the abnormal announcement period return equation (Equation (6)) under the open market repurchase regime. The corresponding tstatistics are given in the t-stat column. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
